Taming the Environmental Protection Agency: Lender Liability in the Aftermath of Kelley v. EPA by Alvarez, Sander
Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 3
Number 3 Spring 1996 Article 9
1-1-1996
Taming the Environmental Protection Agency:
Lender Liability in the Aftermath of Kelley v. EPA
Sander Alvarez
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sander Alvarez, Taming the Environmental Protection Agency: Lender Liability in the Aftermath of Kelley v. EPA, 3 Hastings West





Lender Liability in the
Aftermath of Kelley v. EPA
Sander Alvarez
I. Introduction
Over a decade ago, in response to an enormous
amount of public concern over the nation's hazardous
waste sites and over hazardous substances in general.
Congress embarked on an ambitious attempt to restore
the quality of our environment.' Congress sought a way to
deal with the release and threatened release of hazardous
substances from thousands of hazardous waste sites and
landfills throughout the nation.2 It also sought to deter
future conduct that could lead to the release of hazardous
substances into the environment. In 1980. Congress'
efforts culminated in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response. Compensation, and Liability Act 3 ("CERCLA" or
the "Act").
CERCLA has made it possible for thousands of haz-
ardous waste sites around the nation to be identified-for
cleanup by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
states, and private parties.4 However, for many people, this
giant bear of environmental regulation has been clumsy
and inefficient.5 For example, courts interpreting the Act
have expressed their frustration with its numerous ambi-
guities.6 Similarly. some complain that too much time is
& J.D. 1996. University of California. Hastings College of the Law. BA.
Amherst College. 1992. Thanks to the WVst-Nortbncst board and staff for all
of their support.
1. Sez gmraly S. RE. No. 848. 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 3-10 (1980)
(describing Environmental Protection Agency studies which reveal that
many of the nations hazardous waste sites contain tons of improperly
buned hazardous waste materials). repinted ht I SE=C- co!,m. o. EedTAvD
PuB. WoRs. 97TH Co,%r.. 2o Sss.. A L ,sLw.rE HisroaYczvo=Cco :.zFnzrsri
EvIRoNMENTAL Rrspo,.sc. Co. m.ou. , Arm Lt..iur" Acr OF 1980
(SuPERFUND). Pus. L 96-510. at 310-17 (Comm. Print 1983) ihereinafter I
LEctsLTmW Hisroyl.
2. By 1979. the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that
about 32.000 to 50.000 waste disposal sites nught contain hazardous waste.
Toxic SuBSTAmcES S .o Ar s Co, 4mEL. U.S. Cou;cu. o:u EwomNAL
QUAm. RRo O m Pm=ENr. at V-3 (Pub. Rev. Draft. Aug. 1979). The
tbreat of these waste sites is betterappreciated when one considers that in
1979 it was estimated that groundwater is 'the primary source of drinking
water for approximately one-half the nation. ld. at V-1.
Moreover. -estimates prepared for EPA...proiect an average of 2.216
spills in excess of 100 gallons each year from 1978 through 1982." i. (citing
ARTHUR D. LmiTT. ii~t.. EswL'Amonl arms FRsm.c A.-o cosrs AssomwxmH
THE CLANUP OF HAzmwus MATEAls Snus (1978)).
3. Pub. L No. 96-510.94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)). Since its enactment. CERCLA has been amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthonzation Act of 1986 ISARAI.
Pub. L No. 99-499. 100 Stat. 1615 (codified as amended in various sections
of 10. 26.29,33. and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
4. See gintralEI , Et=. .vm zl PoTEc, Ao-, cv. A t.1 Mxuv.sr REviFw
OF THE SUPERFufD 1Ro0m- 2 (1989).
5. See, e.g.. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.. 632 F Supp.
573.578 (D. Md. 1986) ('The structure of ICERCLAs liability scheme ml sec-
tion 107(a). 142 US.C. § 9607(a).1 like so much of this hastily patched
together compromise Act. Is not a model of statutory clarity..
6. S¢ KlmberlyA. Marsh. Note. Hazardous Waste. 21 EDvr_ L 1141.1141
n.2 (1991) (dting cases in which courts express frustration at CERCL~s lack
of darity).
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consumed litigating CERCLAs statutory vague-
ness. 7 Despite these complaints, CERCLA has
been, if nothing else, better than nothing, espe-
cially when one considers the fact that at the time
of CERCLAs enactment, existing law had proven
inadequate in handling the problem of inactive
waste sites.8
CERCLA is up for reauthorization in 1996.
Congress should use this critical opportunity to
address many of the Act's deficiencies, including
the issue of lender liability.9 This Note addresses
lender liability under CERCLA which, from the
perspective of secured creditors, threatens to
impose on them the cost of cleaning up contami-
nated property that they merely hold as collater-
al.iO Part II provides a general overview of
CERCLA's legislative history and relevant liability
provisions,"i including cost-recovery actions.12
Part Ill describes CERCLAs secured creditor
exemptioni 3 and EPA's attempt to clarify the
secured creditor exemption through its Final
Lender Liability Rulei 4 (EPA Final Rule). Part IV
examines the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Kelley v. EPA15 to vacate the
EPA Final Rule, and the implications for lender
liability. Although lenders can no longer rely on
the EPA Final Rule to clarify the scope of lender
liability under CERCLA, the author hopes to
demonstrate that an extensive examination of
lender liability case law can provide lenders with
meaningful insight into what practices may or may
not result in CERCLA liability. The outlook to be
gleaned from existing cases is not totally grim.
Finally, Part V reports on the efforts underway
to provide lenders with legislative relief. Codifying
the EPA Final Lender Liability Rule is one method
7. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAw, SCIENCE, AND POUCY 294 (1992) (noting that while some argue
that CERCL's liability scheme has "wasted resources on litiga-
tion," its success could instead be measured by whether its lia-
bility scheme is -effective in deternng environmental releases').
The enormous risk faced by CERCLA defendants as a result of
joint and several liability is another reason why CERCLA may
generate expensive protracted litigation. it has been estimated
that as much as 88% of CERCLA related costs can be attributed
to litigation and other non-remedial costs. Don I. Debenedictus.
How Superfund Money Is Spent, 78 A.B.A.J. 30 (Sept. 1992).
8. See infra notes 21-27.
9.42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
10. E.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.. 632 F.
Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046
(1991). Both cases are discussed infra part Ill. From the perspec-
tive of a lender, the situation is even worse. Because CERCLA
imposes strict. joint, and several liability, lenders can face liabil-
ity far in excess of the value of the collateral they hold. SeeAnn M.
Burkhart, Lenders/Owners and CERCLAk Title and Liability, 25 HAPv. J.
ON LEGIs. 317. 323 (1988). Municipal and state governments and
by which Congress is attempting to clarify lender
liability. Other proposals would provide EPA with
greater power to enact rules which in the judgment
of the agency are necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of CERCLA. While clarification of CERCLAs
security exemption is arguably warranted, Congress
can accomplish this goal without granting EPA any
more power than it already has. The author cautions
lenders and Congress from supporting legislation
that goes beyond codification of the EPA Final Rule,
inasmuch as granting EPA broad interpretive
authority under CERCLA creates the potential for
EPA to frustrate, rather than clarify, CERCLA's
ambiguous liability scheme.
I. CERCLA Overview
A. Legislative History and Statutory Purpose
The congressional action that lead to the enact-
ment of CERCLA was initially motivated by public
concern over the dangers of toxic sLbstances that
grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s as a result of
vanous incidents of toxic substance contamina-
tion.16 For example, in 1972, Delaware officials dis-
covered that the gradual release of hazardous sub-
stances from a landfill had leached into the ground-
water supply of thousands of nearby residents. 17 In
1974, an 850,000 gallon tank containing silicon
tetrachloride ruptured in Chicago, forcing thou-
sands of residents to evacuate the surrounding area
after a toxic cloud formed over their community.18
Exposure to the toxic cloud caused some residents
to suffer burns of their skin and mucous mem-
branes. 19 Approximately 300 people were hospital-
ized, and one person died after losing conscious-
ness and falling down. 20
federal agencies also complain that CERCLA threatens to impose
on them liability for property they acquire but for which they have
not caused a release of hazardous substances.
!1. The Act's primary liability provision Is CERCLA § 107,42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
12. CERCLA § 107(a)(4). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
13. CERCLA § 101 (20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
14. Security Interest Exemption, 40 C.F.R. -) 300.1100 (1994).
15. 15 F3d I 100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S, Ct. 910 (1994),
16. See Toxic STRATEGEs CoMMrrrEE, supra ncte 2, at i-I to 1-9.
17. Id. at 1-7. It was estimated that approximately 170,000
gallons of highly polluted liquid had leached irto the water sup-
ply. Id. This type of incident is not atypical. Love Canal In Niagara
Falls. New York. is probably the most famous example of ground-
water contamination due to leaching from landfills, See S. REP. No.
848, supra note 1, at 315-17.
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The enactment of CERCLA was also motivated by
the growing realization in the late 1970s that the
existing array of environmental statutes were inca-
pable of addressing the threat of toxic substance
releases from these waste sites.2' For example, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act2 (RCRA)
focuses on present and future--i.e., acive-toxic
waste facilities, and not on past-i.e., ittactie-toxic
waste facilities33 In addition. RCRAs usefulness as an
emergency response tool is limited by the fact thdt
"while [RCRAI contains an emergency powers clause,
it requires an identifiable, financially solvent liable
party and prolonged judicial action."24 Other statutes
also proved inadequate. While the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 197225 (FWPCA) requires that
discharges of oil and hazardous substances be report-
ed or those responsible would incur penalties, it only
applies to navigable waters.26 Thus, the FWPCA is
useless for toxic substance releases on land.2
7
As its name suggests, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response. Compensation, and
Liability Act was enacted to (1) establish an emer-
gency response system to deal with the release28 of
hazardous materials in the environment, (2) to com-
pensate non-liable parties who incur costs for clean-
ing up contaminated property, and (3) to impose lia-
bility on those responsible for the uncontrolled
release of hazardous substances. 9 The Act incorpo-
rates various mechanisms in order to achieve its goals.
21. See Administration Testimony. Statement of Thomas C.
lorling. EPA. I LEGsim-v Hi-roc. supra note 1.at 62.Also. theToxic
Substances Strategy Committee concluded in its 1979 Draft Report
to the President- -New legislative and administrative actions are
needed to provide authorization for federal cleanup of inactive haz-
ardous waste disposal sites and spills and for contingency funds for
such action. The TSSC specifically recommends adoption of the Oil.
Hazardous Substances and Hazardous Waste Response. Liability
and Compensation Act..' Toxic SuBsrA cEs STRATEcY Coww=mt,
supra note 2. at V-21 to V-22. The proposed "Oil. Hazardous
Substances and Hazardous Waste Response. Liability and
Compensation Act' went on to become part of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response. Compensation. and Liability Act of 1980.
22. RCRA is contained in subchapter ll. 42 U.S.C. §§
6921-39e (1994). of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-91k (1994).
23. Jorling. supra note 21. at 61.
24. Id.
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. 33 U.S.C.
§§1251-1387 (also known as the "Clean Water Act').
26. lorling. supra note 21. at 61.
27. Id.
28. CERCLA defines a 'release' as "any spilling, leaking.
pumping, pounring. emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting.
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.'
CERCLA § 10](22). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994). A "release' or
-releases.' as used in this Note, will mean a "release,' as defined
above, of a hazardous substance.
29. Pub. L No. 96-510. 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42
For example, to promote quick cleanup responses.
CERCLA requires the President to promulgate a
national contingency plan o establishing procedures
and standards for responding to uncontrolled releas-
es3 Another emergency response and cleanup mech-
anism within CERCLA can be found in section
106(a).3 Under section 106(a). when the government
determines that'an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to the public health or welfare or the envi-
ronment exists, EPA33 may order a private party to
dean up the hazardous vraste contamination.34
The Act also establishes the Hazardous
Substance Superfund35 (Superfund) to reimburse
non-liable parties for the costs they incur cleaning
up contaminated property. Additionally CERCLA
creates a general liability scheme36 designed "to
place the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up
hazardous waste on those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poison."7 While
CERCLA relies on all of these mechanisms to pro-
mote the Acts objectives, it is CERCLAs general lia-
bility scheme that may be the most ambitious.
B. CERCLAs Liability Scheme: "Shoot First, Ask
Questions Later"3
Holding those responsible for toxic substance
releases liable for their sins is not unique to CER-
CLA. However, before CERCLA was enacted, estab-
lishing liability was generally a predicate for getting
U.S.C. f 9601-75 (1994)).
30. CERCLA § 105.42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994).
31. Foran insightful dLscusson of the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) and CERCLA private cost-recovery actions see James
R. Deason. Note. Cklaras Mud:Vz. Function oIk.e National Contingency
PLn Consstcj Reuiremmt In a CERCLA PriateCost-Reomry Action,
28 GA. L Rsv. 555. 575-84 (1994).
32.42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
33. while CERCLA requires the President to promulgate a
national contingency plan to respond to hazardous contarmna-
tion. see supra notes 30. 31. the President has in turn delegated
most of his § 105 authority, as well as most of his CERCLA
authority, to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12.580 § l(bl(l). reprinted in
42 U.S.CA § 9615 app.. at 291-95 (1993 West Supp.).
34.42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
35.26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994).
36. Section 107 is CERCLs primary liability provision. 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). It is considered 'the badbone of CERCLAs
liability scheme.' L De-Wayne Layfield. Note. CERCLA. Succezssor
Izi.tIy. and t.e Fedral Comrnon Law. Responding to an Uncertain Legal
Standard. 68 T. L Rv. 1237.1241 (IM0).
37. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.. 901 F.2d 1550. 1553
(1 th Cit 1990). cert. denied. 498 US. 1046 (1991) (citations omit-
ted) (quotations omitted).
38. In Kelley v. EPA. Judge Silberman of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals descibed CERCLAs statutory
scheme 'as requiring parties to shoot first (clean up) and ask
questions (determine who bears the ultimate liability) later." 15
E3d 1100. 1106 (D.C. Cir.). cert. den d. 115 S. Ct. 900 (1994).
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a toxic substance release cleaned up.39 The problem
with this traditional strategy is that toxic substance
releases generally pose an ongoing danger to the
environment and to public health. A release is
made worse if immediate action is not taken, as in
the case of toxic substances leaching into ground-
water supplies.40 It is for this reason that CERCLA
operates to "postpone" the liability stage and
addresses the cleanup issue first, or at least con-
currently with determining liability. This strategy is
largely dictated by necessity and does not imply
that the identification of liable parties is not impor-
tant under CERCLA. In fact, CERCLA was enacted
with the hope that those who were responsible for
toxic substance releases were made to pay the costs
of cleanup.41 Consequently, CERCLAs liability
scheme-of which section 10742 is the backbone-
is designed with this goal in mind.
When EPA identifies a hazardous substance
release, it has two choices. EPA can either under-
take the cleanup effort itself, or it can issue an
administrative cleanup order to a private party. 43
When EPA undertakes to clean up a hazardous sub-
stance release itself, upon completing the cleanup
effort, EPA can seek to recover the cleanup costs. 44
EPA can bring a cost-recovery action against any-
one it feels is liable under section 107(a) for the
hazardous substance release.45
If it does not want to clean up the hazardous
substance release itself, EPA will often find a "deep
pocket" with some connection to the release who
will be able to bear the burden of cleaning up the
release. 46 CERCLA authorizes EPA to issue orders
under section 106(a) requiring private parties to
clean up a site.47 Compliance with the EPA order is
mandatory and it makes no difference whether or
not the party is liable for the release. 48 Liability is
only determined after the party complies with the
cleanup order and then seeks reimbursement from
the Superfund pursuant to section 106(b)(2). 49
Whether EPA undertakes the cleanuD effort itself or
forces a private party to bear the cleanup burden,
CERCLAs liability scheme under section 107(a)
ultimately comes into play. EPA can only recover
from a private party if it proves that the party is
liable under section 107(a). For the private party
forced to undertake the cleanup itse.lf, that party is
entitled to reimbursement from the Superfund if it
proves under section 107(a) that it is not liable for
the contamination.50
"The essential policy underlying CERCLA is to
place the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up
hazardous waste on 'those responsible for prob-
lems caused by the disposal of cherical poison."' 51
To effectuate this goal, CERCLA imposes liability
on four classes of potentially responsible parties
PRPs). The first class of PRPs under CERCLA are
all present owners and operators of a facility where
hazardous substances were released or where there
is a threat of release. 52 CERCLA also imposes lia-
bility on all owners or operators of a facility at the
time the hazardous wastes were released.,5 3 These
first two classes of PRPs can be summarized to
include all present and past owners or operators of
a facility where hazardous substances were
released. Finally, CERCLA also imposes liability on
those who arrange for treatment or disposal at the
facility,54 as well as on those who transport the haz-
ardous waste to the facility."
With respect to liability for the costs of haz-
ardous waste cleanup, the source of much fear for
lenders/creditors comes from section 107(a)(1) and
(2) which imposes strict liability56 on all past and
present "owners and operators" of hazardous waste
39. For example, the Senate report accompanying Senate
Bill 1480 (one of the various bills creating CERCLA) indicated
that liln cases like Love Canal. where the disposer is known and
able to pay, the Federal Government [did] have authority to
sue ... to seek clean up. But the uncharted legal pathway will be
lengthy and uncertain." S. REP. No. 848. supra note 1. at 318 (empha-
sis added).
40. See, e.g.. Toxic SuasTANcES SiiATEGIEs CoMMrrrEE. supra
note 2, at 1-7: S. REP. No. 848, supra note i. at 315-17.
41. To rectify the "problems faced by society as a result of
chemical contamination.' it is necessary to assure "that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm. or injury from
chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions." S. REP. No. 848,
supra note 1. at 319-20.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
43. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
44. CERCLA § 106, 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9606.9607 (1994); Kelley
v. EPA. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 910 (1994).
45. CERCLA '§ 106, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (1994).
46. This could be a property owner or the owner or operator
of a business connected to the release.
47. 42 U.S.C. 9606(a) (1994).
48. id. See 15 E3d at 1106.
49.42 U.S C. § 9606(b)(2) (1994). See 15 F3d at 1106.
50. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
51. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 9)1 F.2d 1550, 1553
(1 th Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (citing Florida
Power and Light v. Allis Chalmers, 893 E2d 1313, 1316 (11 th Cir,
1990); United States v. Aceto Agncultural Chems, Corp,, 872 F.2d
1373. 1377 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham Water Co, v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, 805 E2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)).
52. CERCLA § 107(a)(1). 42 U.S.C, § 9607(a)(1) (1994),
53. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
54. CERCLA § 107(a)(3). 42 U.S.C. §' 9607(a)(3) (1994).
55. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 US.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
56. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 1. at 34.
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sites.57 The fear that lenders have regarding their
potential liability under CERCLA is illustrated by
the following hypothetical:
Imagine that in 1982, B-Bank loaned D-Debtor
$30,000 to start D's first business, a small neighbor-
hood "mom & pop" store. Within five years, D had
successfully repaid the loan. B considered D a good
customer of its bank.
In 1990. D came to B asking to borrow $75,000
so that it could purchase an adjacent parcel of land
on which it could expand its existing store and also
build a parking lot to accommodate its growing
number of customers. B undertook an investigation
of D's existing property and business, as well as of
the proposed expansion site. B's investigation
failed to discover any obvious problems that would
have called into question the value of the property
involved in the deal. Moreover, because D agreed to
give B a security interest in the real property on
which the new market and parking lot would be
located, and a secured interest in its inventory, B
had every reason to believe that issuing the loan
was a sound business move. Thus, B approved the
$75,000 loan.
D's newly expanded market did well for the first
couple of years. However, in 1992 Safeway decided-to
build a new supermarket in the neighborhood. Upon
the completion of the new Safeway supermarket, D's
business began to suffer dramatically. As a result, D
began to fall back on his loan payments, even after D
and B made efforts to restructure the loan. Eventually,
B had no choice but to foreclose on the loan.
Soon after B acquired title to the land, it dis-
covered that fifty one-gallon drums of some haz-
ardous substance had been buried on the foreclosed
property some thirty years before. EPA subsequent-
ly had the area cleaned up. Later. EPA informed B
that it owed EPA $500,000 for the cleanup costs.
Although title to the property was transferred to it, B
had no intention of "owning or operating" any busi-
ness on the land. As a bank, B only hoped to take
57.42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I}H2) (1994); Kelley v. EPA. 15 E3d
l100, 1103 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, u15 S. Ct. 900 (1994). Section
107(a)(1) uses the language -owner and operator' while §
I01(20)(A) uses 'owner or operator.' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I).
9601(20)(A) (1994) (emphasis added). This is a pnme example of
CECLKs lack of clarity. Many courts which have recognized this
particular inconsistency in language have chosen to view the
phrase in the disjunctive and not in the conjunctive. See, eg.,
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.. 632 E Supp. 573, 578
(D. Md. 1986).
CERCLA also imposes liability on:
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per-
son, by any other party or entity, at any facility or man-
eration vessel owned or operated by another party or
title to the land in order to sell the property and
hopefully recover the amount outstanding on the
foreclosed loan. Arguing that it had nothing to do
with the burying of the drums, B insisted that it was
grossly unfair for EPA to hold it liable for an amount
six times greater than the original loan to D.
Lenders faced with massive liability as
described above have attempted to escape the situ-
ation in various ways. One method has been to
demonstrate that as secured creditors they are not
within one of the groups of potentially liable parties
under section 107.53 In other words, lenders may
attempt to show that they are neither owners nor
operators of hazardous waste sites. However, that
defense is unavailable for lenders who end up hold-
ing title to contaminated property due to foreclo-
sure of a loan since they and no one else are then
the 'owner." The only remedy available to these
lenders is a statutorily created "safe harbor provi-
sion' within CERCLA which is referred to as the
secured creditor exemption.9
III. The Secured Creditor Exemption and the EPA
Final Lender Liability Rule
Within CERCLAs list of terms and definitions in
section 101,60 Congress attempted to statutorily
exempt certain owners-certain secured credi-
tors-from CERCLAs definition of "owner."
Specifically, Congress provided that the term
"owner or operator did not include "a person, who,
without participating in the management of a vessel
or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest. 61 Secured creditors
hoped that this would be the vehicle bywhich they
could escape potential section 107 liability.
Unfortunately, case law interpretation of the
secured creditor exemption has not been a model of
consistency.62 Some cases clearly stated that a
lender would fall outside the exemption only if it
actually participated in a borrower's day to day
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facili-
ties, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son. from which there Is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs.
of a hazardous substance....
CERCLA § 107(a)(3H4). 42 U.S.C § 9607(a1(3H4) (1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). See sura notes 51-56 and
accompanying text.
59. CERCLA § 101(20)(A). 42 US.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
60.42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
61. CERCLA § 101(20](A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20(A) (1994).
62. Conflicting judicial opinions as to the secured aeditor
exemption are discussed infra part Ill.
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operations. 63 On the other hand, one case explained
that a lender could fall outside the exemption in the
absence of actual participation in the day to day
operations of a facility, "by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indi-
cating a capacity to influence the [borrower's] treat-
ment of hazardous wastes."64
The earliest example of the former cases is United
States v. Mirabile. 65 Among the various defendants in the
case were (1) the Mirabiles, the title owners of conta-
minated property cleaned up by EPA, (2) the American
Bank and Trust Company (ABT) which financed the
Mirabiles' purchase of the property, and (3) the
Mellon Bank (East) National Association (Mellon)
which financed a business operating on the Mirabiles'
propertyf6 As the current title/legal owners of the
property, the Mirabiles had little chance of winning a
summary judgment motion regarding whether they
were owners of the property. Hence, the actual issue
in the case was whether either of the two secured
creditors-ABT or Mellon-had incurred CERCLA lia-
bility as a result of their participation with the debtor.
With respect to ABT, the Mirabile court held that
ABT was not liable under CERCLA section 107(a).67 In
reaching this decision, the court, in effect, concluded
that a lender does not necessarily incur liability when
it forecloses on its security interest. Even though at
one point ABT had foreclosed on the contaminated
property at issue, and thereafter bid successfully for
the property at the foreclosure sale, ABT never
acquired legal title to the subject property.68 Instead,
shortly after the foreclosure sale, ABT assigned the
"sheriffs deed" in its possession to the Mirabiles who
became the title owners. 69 In the court's opinion,
ABTs activities surrounding the foredosure were con-
sistent with the protection of its security interest.70
Therefore, ABT had not forfeited its exemption.7'
63. United States v. Mirabile. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20.994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4. 1985). accord United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193. 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
64. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550. 1557
(I ith Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
65. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20.994.
66. Id. at 20,994-95.
67. Id. at 20.996-97.
68. Id. at 20,996. in In re T.P. Long Chem.. Inc., 45 B.R. 278(N.D. Ohio 1985). the court also relied on the distinction between
equitable and legal titles in determining "ownership" under CER-
CLA. While holding that a trustee did not incur CERCLA liability
insofar as trustees do not technically acquire title to the proper-
ty of an estate, the court held that the debtor's estate, neverthe-
less, was liable. Id. at 283. "The debtors ownership interest in the
drums, i.e. the debtor's title to the drums, became, therefore, an
interest includable in property of the estate. Thus. it is the estate
itself and not the trustee which is the owner of the drums." Id.
69. 1 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
70. Id. "in the instant case, ABT merely foreclosed on the
property after all operations had ceased and thereafter took pru-
Apart from its foreclosure activities, the court
considered whether ABT's other involvement with the
Mirabiles could make it liable as an owner/operator
under CERCLA section 107(a).7 2 Of particular signifi-
cance to this question was the fact that after ABT
acquired the sheriffs deed to the subject property,
ABT tried to find out how much it would cost to
remove certain drums located on the property.7 3
Nevertheless, in the opinion of the court, ABTs
actions did not warrant any liability.74 The court
explained that "before a secured creditor such as ABT
may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate
in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site."7 5
The year after the Mirabile decision, a Maryland
district court introduced a stricter interpretation of
the secured creditor exemption. In United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,7 6 the court was presented
with the issue of whether a creditor who once held
a mortgage to a parcel of land, later foreclosed on
the mortgage, then subsequently purchased the
land at its foreclosure sale, and presently continues
to own it, is liable to the United States for the costs
the government incurred cleaning up hazardous
waste located on the land.7 7 Of significance, at least
to Maryland Bank & Trust Company (MB&T), was
the fact that it only acquired title to the property
after the contamination on the property had
occurred. 78
The United States argued that MB&T was liable
for the waste cleanup based on CERCLA section
107(a)(1).7 9 MB&T, on the other hand, argued that It
was exempt from the definition of "owner and oper-
ator" based on CERCLA section 101 (20)(A).80 MB&T
contended that its activities on the sibject proper-
ty should justifiably be characterized as activity that
was solely "indicia of ownership"8 1 primarily to pro-
tect its security interest in the propery.82
dent and routine steps to secure the property against further
depreciation." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a). 9601(20)(A) (1994),
73. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
74. Id.
75. Id. "Mere financial ability to control waste disposal prac-
tices of the sort possessed by IABTI in this case Is not, lIn the
court's viewl, sufficient for the imposition of liability," Id. at 20,995,
76.632 F Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
77. Id. at 574.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 577. CERCLA § 107(a) imposes liability on "the
owner and operator of a vessel [otherwise subject to the lurlsdlc-
tion of the United Statesl or a facility." 42 U.S,C, § 9607(a)(1)
(1994).
80. Id. § 9601(20)(A).
81. Id.
82. 632 F. Supp. at 577.
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The Maryland court admitted that on its face sec-
tion 107(a)(1) is unclear as to whether it holds liable
owners and operators, or only parties who are both
owners and operators.8 3 The court held that
"fnlotwithstanding the language 'the owner and
operator,' a party need not be both an owner and
operator-to incur liability" under section 107(a)(1).84
Like the Mirabile court.85 the Maryland court found
support for its decision in CERCLAs legislative his-
'tory.86 The court found that with respect to "facili-
ties,".Congress defined "operator" as one who carries
out operational functions for the owner of the facili-
ty pursuant to an appropriate agreement. 87 From
this definition, the court discerned that an operator
and an owner could not be the same person.88
According to Maryland, a party can be caught in
the liability net cast by CERCLA section 107(a)(1) by
being either an owner or an operator.89 The Maryland
court expressed its agreement with the Second
Circuit's% imposition of strict liability on the current
owner of a facility from which hazardous waste has
been released, without regard to causation. 91
Because MB&T held title to the contaminated prop-
erty for over four years, the court was unpersuaded by
MB&T's argument that it was entitled to the secured
creditor exemption because it acquired ownership of
the property only after foreclosing on its security
interest. 2 The court concluded that the secured cred-
itor exemption only covers that party which, at the
time.of cleanup, holds "indicia of ownership to pro-/
tect a then-held security interest in the land"
In the instant case. the cleanup occurred after
MB&T had foreclosed on the property arid acquired
title to it.94 Because the cleanup occurred while
MB&T held full title and not a security interest in
the property, the court found that MB&T was liable
for the cleanup costs incurred by the United
States." The court explained that"[oInly during the
life of the mortgage did MB&T hold indicia of own-
ership primarily to protect its security interest in the
land."9 6 While this explanation made sense for this
case. it was not clear whether the Maryland court
was departing from MirabildA7 and holding that fore-
closure automatically terminated the secured cred-
itor exemption. The only insight Maryland offers into
this question is that to the extent to which Mirabik's
holding pertains to a situation in which the mort-
gagee-tumed-owner promptly assigns the proper-
ty; the two cases are probably not inconsistent.93
However, the court clearly expressed that it did
not agree with "a rule of broader application.: 9 The
two cases may seem to be at odds with each other,
and they, may also be distinguished in another
respect. In Mirabile. ABT never acquired legal title to
the subject property.00 Moreover, the cleanup of the
property occurred after ABT had assigned its sher-
iff's deed to the Mirabiles1 01 In contrast, MB&T in
Maryland actually acquired full title to the property
and retained such title when the United States
undertook the cleanup of the property.02 As such,
MB&T's security interest, and consequently its
secured creditor exemption, ceased to exist.
Secured creditors' risk of CERCLA liability
reached a high point in 1990 when the Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.m3 refused
to adopt the approach articulated in Mirabile and its
progeny.104 In Fleet Factors. the United States brought
a cost-recovery action against Swainsboro Print
Works (SP\V-the debtor) and Fleet Factors
Corporation (FFC-the secured creditor) seeking to
recover the cost of removing hazardous waste from
SPW's bankrupt textile factory.' 05 FFC and SPWs
83. Id. at 578. See supra note 57.
84. Id. at 577.
85. See supra notes 65-75 and corresponding text.
86. 632 F. Supp. at 578.
87. Id. (citing 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 6119. 6181).
88. 632 F. Supp. at 578.
89. Id. at 577-78.
90. New York v. Shore Realty Corp.. 759 F2d 1032. 1042-44
(2d Cir. 1985).
91. 632 F. Supp at 578. See also S. Rn. No. 848. supra note 1.
at 308. 341.
92.632 F. Supp. at 579.
93. Id.
94. Id. Citing 55 Am. lur. 2d Mortgages. § 785. the court
noted that upon foreclosure of the property. MB&Ts mortgage
terminated. Then. when MB&T subsequently purchased the same
property, its interest -ripened into full title." Id.
95.632 F. Supp. at 582.
96. Id. at 579.
97. Sez supra notes 65-75 and corresponding text.
98.632 R Supp at 580.
99. Id.
100. 15 Envtl. L Rep. (EnvtL L Inst.) 20.994.20.996 (FD. Pa.
Sept. 4. 1985).
101. 15 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) at 20.994-95.
102.632 E Supp. at 579.
103.901 F2d 1550. 1558 (lth Cir. 1990). Cert. ded. 498 U.S.
1046 (1991).
104. In addition to Mirahileand In reT.P. Long. a Pennsylvania
district court adopted the "actual managemenr approach in
determining the extent to which a mortgagee may particpate in
the management of a facility without incumng CERCLA liability
as an owner or operator under § 107(a)(l). (2). 42 US.C. §
9607(a)(1), (2) (1994). In United States v. Nicolet. Inc. 712 E
Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989). the court followed Mirafifr and held
that-only If a mortgagee participated In the managerial and oper-
ational aspects of the faclity-hence not lust mere financial par-
tiopation--could the mortageelaeditor become liable under
CERCLA Id. at 1205.
105. 901 F2dat 1552.
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relationship commenced when FFC agreed to
advance capital to SPW against the assignment of
SPW's accounts receivable. 10 6 To procure the
advancements, SPW gave FFC a security interest in
SPW's textile facility, including all of its equipment,
inventory, and fixtures. 107 SPW eventually went
bankrupt, and FFC undertook various measures to
protect its security interest, including foreclosure
on some of SPW's equipment and inventory. 08
Thereafter, EPA inspected the facility and discov-
ered 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing toxic
chemicals. 10 9 The EPA responded to the environ-
mental threat posed by the toxic chemicals and
incurred $400,000 in response costs.iiO
In its suit against FFC, the government con-
tended that FFC was liable as either a presentiii
or past owner 12 of the facility." 3 The trial court
denied the government's motion for summary
judgment regarding FFC's liability under section
107(a)(l). 114 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed.i 5 It explained that inasmuch as
Emanuel County was the present owner of the
facility-having taken over from the trustee
appointed by the bankruptcy court-there was no
way that FFC could be considered a present
owner or operator within the meaning of section
107(a). 116
Regarding FFC's section 107(a)(2) liability, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that a secured creditor
will fall outside the protection afforded by the
secured creditor exemption "by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indi-
cating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes."' i 7 The court exam-
ined FFC's activities" 8 and stated that there was
enough evidence to find that FFC's involvement in
the financial management of the facility was perva-
sive if not complete." 9 In adopting this narrower
interpretation of the secured creditor exemption,
the Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected Mirabile.'20
In addition to the possibility of incurring lia-
bility due to (1) foreclosure and the subsequent
acquisition of full title to contaminated proper-
ty,121 or (2) involvement in the day-to-day opera-
tions of a facility upon which hazardous waste is
released, 122 Fleet Factors expanded the possibility of
CERCLA liability to secured creditors who partici-
pate in the "financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the cor-
poration's treatment of hazardous wastes,1 23 The
Eleventh Circuit expressed its opinion that the
Fleet Factors standard should have the effect of
encouraging responsible lending practices among
lenders. 124 Whether or not the court':5 decision has
in fact encouraged "responsible" lending practices,
there is little doubt that the decision was not well
received by the lending community. 125
As the aforementioned decisions were unfold-
ing, U.S. bank regulatory agencies began taking over




109. Id. at 1553.
i io. Id.
I 1. CERCLA § 107(a)( 1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i) (1994).
112. CERCLA § 107(a)(2). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
113. 901 F2d at 1554.
114. Id.at 1553.
115. id. at 1554-56, 1560.
116. Id. at 1554-56.
117. Id. at 1557.
118. The court pointed to the fact that:
Fleet required SPW to seek its approval before shipping
its goods to customers, established the price for excess
inventory, dictated when and to whom the finished
goods should be shipped, determined when employees
should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office
administrator at the site. received and processed SPW's
employment and tax forms, controlled access to the
facility, and contracted with Baldwin to dispose of the
fixtures and equipment at SPW.
Id. at 1559.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1558.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank &Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L, Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4. 1985),
123. 901 F.2d at 1557. Fleet Factors further warned that "a
secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the man-
agement of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste dispcsal decisions If it
so chose.' Id. at 1558.
124. Id. The court explained:
Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to
investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems and
policies of potential debtors. ... Similaily, creditors'
awareness that they are potentially liable under CERCLA
will encourage them to monitor the hazardous waste
treatment systems and policies of their lexistingl
debtors and insist upon compliance with acceptable
treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and
future financial support.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. See generally David R. Berz & Peter M. Gillon, Lender
Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING
L.I. 4 (1991).
Sander Alvarez Volume 3, Numbo 3
Se~fng 1996 Tn h n~vmnd~~cc ec
tions. 26 The EPA became concerned that section
107 liability could eventually extend to the federal
government if the regulatory agencies, like private
secured creditors, were considered "owners or oper-
ators" of security interests which they now pos-
sessed. 2 7 The combination of EPA and lender con-
cern over conflicting judicial interpretations as to
the meaning of the secured creditor exemption
prompted EPA td issue a final regulation in 1992
defining the exemption.128
The EPA Final Rule provided a framework for
lenders to determine just what type of behavior
would cause forfeiture of their statutory exemption
from the CERCLA definition of "owner and opera-
tor." 2 9 For example, lenders understood that prior
to taking a security interest they would not incur
any liability for engaging in investigatory proce-
dures, such as inspecting the facility and requiring
that the borrower comply with all environmental
laws. 30 Additionally, lenders were assured that
when a borrower encountered difficulties paying off
the loan, a lender could try to help out the borrow-
er by negotiating a possible settlement without the
threat of section 107(a)(1) and (2) liability.'3' Most
significantly, in the above example of B-Bank and
D-Debtor, the EPA Final Rule would protect B. so
long as B did not participate in the management of
D's - business prior to foreclosing on the property,
and provided B made a diligent effort to divest itself
of the property. 32
While lenders welcomed the EPA Final Rule,
others saw it as a threat to third party recovery
actions. In 1992, the state of Michigan133 and the
Chemical Manufacturers Association 34 filed peti-
tions to review the EPA Final Rule. On February 4,
1994, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the
EPA Final Rule. 135
126. See Kelleyv. EPA. 15 F3d 1100, 1104. 1104 n.i (DC. Cir.).
cert. denied, I 5 S. Ct. 900 (1994). -Federal bank regulatory agencies
Isuch as the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission and the
Resolution Trust Corporation] might themselves be considered
'owners and operators' of collateral property held by failed thrifts
after their appointment as receivers or conservators of the
thrifts.' Id. at 1104 n.I (citations omitted).
127. Id.
128. Security Interest Exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100
(1992).
129. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(1).
130. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(2).
131. id. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(B).
132. Id. § 300.1 100(d).
133. Michigan's petition waspresented in CV 92-1312 in the
District of Columbia Circuit.
134. Chemical Manufacturers Association's petition was
presented in CV 92-1314 in the District of Columbia Circuit.
IV. Kelley v. EPA: The D.C. Circult Vacates the EPA
Final Lender Llabllty Rule
A. EPA's Lack of Authority to Promulgate
Regulations Limiting Private Rights of Action
CERCLA section 113(a) provides the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review any regulation promulgated
under CERCLA.136 In Kelley. the State of
Michigan and the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA), as potential litigants under
section 107. filed petitions for review of the EPA
Final Rule. The State of Michigan and the CMA
did not want to be precluded from suing
lenders. 137 Inasmuch as CERCLA imposes joint
and several liability, it is advantageous for any
potentially responsible party that liability
extends to others as well. Thus, Michigan and
the CMA challenged the'EPA Final Rule because
they feared that the potential pool of responsi-
ble parties was going to shrink.
In vacating the EPA Final Rule. the court held
that "EPA lacks statutory authority to restrict by reg-
ulation private rights of action arising under ICER-
CLAI."'13 The court acknowledged that the President
has broadly delegated his statutory powers of
enforcement to EPA. thereby enabling it to promul-
gate substantive regulations under CERCLA1 39
However. the court also .noted "that with respect to
any specific regulation. EPA must demonstrate
either explicit or implicit evidence of congressional
intent to delegate interpretive authority."140 Thus,
because the EPA Final Rule implicated liability
issues.141 the issue in the case became whether
defining the scope of liability falls within the
responsibilities and powers Congress delegated to
EPA under CERCLA. 42
135. Kelleyv. EPA. 15 F3d 1100 (D.C. Ci). cert. denied. 115 S.
Ct. 900 (1994). The reasons for the D.C. Circuit's decision and the
current status of lender liability are discussed below in part IV.
136. CERCLA § 113(a) provides:
Review of any regulation promulgated under this chap-
ter may be had upon application by any interested per-
son only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States for the District of Columbia. Any such application
shall be made within ninety days from the date of pro-
mulgation of such regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
137. 15 F3d at 1104-05.
138. Id. at! 103.
139. Id. at 1105. See also Wagner Seed Co.. Inc. v. Bush. 946
F2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991). aI, dentid. 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992).
140. 15 F,3d at 1105 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
14 1. See CERCLA § 107.42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994). See alo CER-
CIA § 101(20)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
142.15 F3dat 1105.
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Reviewing CERCLAs statutory provisions, the
D.C. Circuit explained that CERCLA clearly provided
for private rights of action. 43 The court stated that
"qIluestions of liability [should be] put at issue in
federal court by disputing private parties-without
any government involvement." 144 The court found
support for its view in CERCLA's legislative history,
noting Congress intended the courts, not EPA, to be
the sole adjudicator of section 107 liability. 45 In the
court's opinion, it could not be argued that
Congress ever intended that EPA, a potential plain-
tiff, be given the authority to define by regulation
the scope of liability of defendants. 46
The court also rejected EP's argument that
the validity of its lender liability rule should be
upheld as an interpretive rule if the Rule was
defeated as a substantive or legislative one.' 47 An
agency's characterization of a rule is "relevant,"
although not necessarily "dispositive."148 A better
way to distinguish between interpretive and leg-
islative rules is to determine what the rule accom-
plishes. In other words, a rule is interpretive if it
simply expresses what the administrative agency
"thinks" the underlying statute means, reminding
the affected parties of "existing duties" only. 49
When an agency in essence creates new law, rights,
or duties, its rulemaking activities may properly be
deemed to be legislative and not interpretive in
nature.150 Therefore, any attempt to supplement,
and not simply to construe a statute, by means of
implementing regulations, "must be treated as ...
legislative."'
What ultimately distinguishes interpretive from
legislative rules is the agency's legal basis for its
actions:
If the rule is based on specific statutory
provisions, and its validity stands or falls
on the correctness of the agency's interpre-
tation of those provisions, it is an interpre-
tative rule. If, however, the rule is based on
an agency's power to exercise its judgment
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(i-(4), 9613(b), 9613(f) (1994).
144. 15 F.3d at 1107.
145. Id. at 1107-08 (citing 126 CONG. Rmc. 30.932 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Randolph) ('It is intended that issues of lia-
bility not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by tradi-
tional and evolving pnnciples of common law.')).
146. id. at 1107.
147. Id. at 1108-09.
148. United Technologies Corp. v. EPA. 821 F.2d 714. 718
(D.C. Cir. 1987). See also General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus. 742
F.2d 1561. 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1074
(1985).
149. 821 F.2d at 718.
as to how best to implement a general
statutory mandate, the rule is likely a leg-
islative one. 1 2
Upon examination, the Kelley court found that
the EPA could not justify its rule as either interpre-
tive' 53 or legislative. 54 The EPA did not attempt to
simply "define" any specific statutory term or provi-
sion. Furthermore, EPA could not render a legisla-
tive rule since it lacked any statutory mandate on
which to base its implementation of the Final Rule.
Implementation of the Final Rule necessarily
encroached on CERCLAs general liability scheme
with particular ramifications for private rights of
action created under the statute. The Kelley court
made clear that liability issues are solely within the
adjudicative powers of the judiciary.
B. Post Fleet Factors Case Law Interpreting the
Secured Creditor Exemption
By vacating the EPA Final Lender Liability Rule
in 1994, the D.C. Circuit effectively resurrected all
the relevant pre-Final Rule case law interpreting the
secured creditor exemption found in section
101(20)(A).1 55 A familiarity with this line of cases
interpreting the scope of the exemption is important
in order to understand the current applicable case
law. As those cases reflected many inconsistencies,
knowledge of the pre-Final Rule cases also serves to
emphasize an existing need for certainty and clarity
in the area of lender liability. The pre-Final Rule
case law has been discussed already in Part Ill. The
remainder of this section focuses on cases decided
after the EPA Final Rule was promulgated to the
extent the cases did not rely on the now-invalid
Final Rule, and discusses recent developments.
While the EPA Final Rule was in effect between
April 29, 1992156 and February 4, 1994 5,7 the First,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals heard
cases involving the interpretation of CERCLA sec-
tion 101 (20)(A), the secured creditor exemption. As
one would expect, no cases invoked :he Fleet Factors
150. Id.
151. Id. at 719. See also Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636
F.2d 464. 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. ,rimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 517 (191I).
152. 821 F.2d at 719-20.
153. Kelley v. EPA. 15 E3d 1100, 1108-09 (D.C. Cit.), cert.
denied. 115 S. Ct 900 (1994).
154. Id. at 1105-08.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994),
156. This is the date when the EPA Final Rule went into
effect. Security Interest Exemption, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
157. This is the date the D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA Final
Lender Liability Rule. Kelley v. EPA, 15 M3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
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"capacity to influence" standard because the EPA
Final Rule required actual participationin the oper-
ational aspects of a borrower's business."58
However even though the EPA Final Rule was in
effect, many courts, including the First, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits, did not rely on the Final Rule.
The Ninth Circuit chose not to adopt the Fleet
Factors standard when it decided In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp. in 1990.159 In re Bergsoe involved three main par-
ties: Bergsoe Metal Corporationi 60 (Bergsoe), the
Port of St. Helens' 6' (Port), and the United States
National Bank of Oregon (Bank). As judge Kozinski
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, the
three parties entered into two sets of complicated
financial transactions which made it difficult to
determine under CERCLA who owned the contami-
nated Bergsoe facility. 62 In the first set of transac-
tions in the late 1970s, the Port agreed to issue
bonds to finance the purchase of real property and
the construction of a lead recycling plant that
Bergsoe would operate. 63 In exchange for the prop-
erty and the facility, Bergsoe gave the Port a
$400,000 promissory note and a mortgage on the
land and facility. 64 The Port and Bergsoe also
entered into a sale-and-lease-back agreement. 16'
Bergsoe agreed to lease the property and the facili-
ty until the bonds were paid off, at which time
Bergsoe could purchase everything for a nominal
sum of $l00.'6
In the second set of transactions, the Bank
agreed to serve as trustee for the bondholders of the
revenue bonds issued by the Port. 67 The Port com-
pleted this arrangement by mortgaging the property
and the facility to the Bank.163 The result of these
complicated transactions was that (1) the revenue
from the bond sales went to Bergsoe, which was
obligated to repay the money to the Bank, and (2)
both the Port and the Bank held some kind of secu-
rity interest in the real property and the facility. 169
158. Security Interest Exemption. 40 C.ER. § 300.1100 (1992).
159. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
160. Bergsoe was founded in 1978 by three other entities.
collectively referred to as EAC, in order to conduct a lead recy-
cling plant. Id at 669.
161. The Port is a municipal corporation authorized to issue




164. id. at 669-70.
165. Id. at 670.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The Bank apparently ended up purchasing the rev-
enue bonds. Id. In exchange for the purchase, the Port subordi-
After Bergsoe encountered financial difficulties
and defaulted on the leases, the Bank appointed a
management company to run the facility."70 The plant
continued to suffer financial difficulties and dosed in
1987.171 Soon thereafter, the Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality discovered that the Bergsoe
site was contaminated.'7 The Bank sued the East
Asiatic Company (EAC), Bergsoe's owners, to collect
on Bergsoe's debts and to hold EAC liable for the
costs of cleaning up the contamination.'7 EAC then
filed a third-party complaint alleging that the Port
was liable for the cleanup. 7 4 The Port moved for sum-
mary judgement, contending that it vas not liable for
the contamination at the Bergsoe facility because it
qualified for CERCLAs secured creditor exemption-173
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Port. and the Ninth Circuit affirmed17 6
With respect to whether the Port held "indicia of
ownership" primarily to protect its security interest in
the Bergsoe investment, Judge Kozinski stated that
"paper title to the Bergsoe plant Ididl not. alone, make
Ithe Portl an owner of the facility for purposes of CER-
CLA."177 The Port held a mortgage on the property and
the facility in order to ensure that Bergsoe would meet
its lease payments. 78 Accordingly. Judge Kozinski con-
cluded that the Port met the "indicia of ownership"
prong of the secured creditor exemption. 79 Judge
Kozinski then went on to examine whether, notwith-
standing the fact that the Port held indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect its investment, the Port had
nevertheless voided the exemption by impermissibly
participating in the management of the Bergsoe facil-
ity. EAC argued that the Port had participated in
Bergsoe's management by having promoted develop-
ment of the facility.I Noting that all secured creditors
generally "have some input at the planning stages of
any large-scale project" Judge Kozinski found that if
such conduct "were 'management.' no secured credi-
tor would ever be protected."' 8'
nated its rights under the $400.000 promissory note to all of the








176. 11 at 670. 673.
177. LL at 67 1.
178. 1L
179. 1. at 671-72.
180. L at 672.
181. IL
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EAC also argued that the Port had participated
in the management of the facility because the Port
had retained the right to inspect and reenter the
Bergsoe facility in case of foreclosure. 8 2 Judge
Kozinski explained that "Irlegardless of what rights
the Port may have had, it cannot have participated
in management if it never exercised them."183 In re
Bergsoe did not promulgate a specific test for deter-
mining when a lender impermissibly participates in
the management of a borrowers business. Judge
Kozinski made clear, though, that "there must be
some actual management of lal facility before a
secured creditor will fall outside the exception."184
As the Port did not engage in actual management of
Bergsoe, Judge Kozinski stated that the court did
not feel obliged to "engage in line drawing."'' 5
Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit, merely having power
to participate in management is not enough. 86
There must be some actual exercise of that power. 187
In United States v. McLambi88 the Fourth Circuit
declined to follow the Fleet Factors line of cases. The
Fourth Circuit did not feel the need to rely on the
EPA Final Rule, which was in effect at the time.189 In
McLamb, the United States initiated a cost-recovery
action against the McLambs, former landowners of
a contaminated site.19 Soon after the case was ini-
tiated, the McLambs filed a contribution claim
against Wachovia Bank & Trust Company
(Wachovia), which originally held a security interest
on the property on which the hazardous substance
release occurred.' 9' After the original borrower had
defaulted on its loan, Wachovia foreclosed on the
loan, purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale, and then promptly sold it. 192
With respect to whether Wachovia held indicia
of ownership primarily to protect its security inter-
est, the McLamb court found that unlike the situa-
tion in Maryland Bank & Trust, here, Wachovia
promptly unloaded the property after it acquired it
at the foreclosure sale 93 The court found "helpful
the analysis in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp." which
emphasized that "paper title to [a facilityl does not,
182. Id.
183. Id. at 673.
184. Id. at 672 (emphasis added). The court reviewed Fleet
Factors and declined to follow its "capacity to influence test." Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 672 n.3.
187. See id. at 672-73.
188. 5 E3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 73.
190. Id. at 70.
191. Id.
192. Id.
alone, make [a partyl an owner of the facility for the
purposes of CERCLA." 94 Accordingly, the McLamb
court held that "because Wachovia took title at the
foreclosure sale solely to protect its security inter-
est and then acted reasonably promptly to divest
itself of ownership, it met §9601(20)(A)'s require-
ment of holding 'indicia of ownership primarily to
protect its security interest."'i95
Regarding whether Wachovia had "participated
in the management" of the property which would
bring Wachovia outside the protection of section
106(20)(A), the McLamb court noted that the district
court specifically found that Wachovia had not
attempted to "develop or manage the property but
continued to hold it solely to protect its security
interest."196 On the facts of the case before it, the
McLamb court was persuaded that Wachovia fell
"within the security interest exemption." 97
Inasmuch as the Fourth Circuit reached its decision
independently of the EPA Final Rule, the case may
be regarded as a continuation of the broader inter-
pretation of the secured creditor exemption typified
by Mirabile and In re Bergsoe, and not as an extension
of the stricter standards of Maryland Bank & Trust and
Fleet Factors.
The First Circuit initially addressed CERCLA's
secured creditor exemption in Watirville Industries,
Inc. v. Finance Authority of Maine.19, In Waterville
Industries, the First Circuit emphasized that its hold-
ing was consistent with the basic policy of the
secured creditor exemption-"to protect bona fide
lenders and to avoid imposing liability on owners
who are not in fact seeking to profit from the invest-
ment opportunity normally presented by prolonged
ownership."'9 A year later, the First Circuit again
faced a case involving lender liability. In Northeast
Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine,20° the First Circuit
held that a creditor did not compromise its eligibil-
ity for the secured creditor exemption under section
101 (20)(A) by conducting an environmental audit. 20'
The Northeast Doran court followed the lead of the
Fourth Circuit in McLamb, as well as its own deci-
193. Id. at 72 n.6.
194. Id. at 72 (quoting In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F,2d
668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990)).
195. Id. at 73 (citing United States v. Mirablle, 15 Envtl, L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20.992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). In re
T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 288-89 (Bankr, N.D. Ohio
1985)).
196. Id. at 73.
197. Id.
198. 984 F2d 549 (Ist Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 553 (quotations omitted).
200. 15 F.3d I (ist Cir. 1994).
201. Id. at 3.
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sion a year earlier in Waterville Industries, which both
essentially held that if lenders take prompt action
to divest themselves of contaminated property and
do not develop or manage it for profit, they will
avoid incurring liability as owners or operators. 20 2
Now that the D.C. Circuit has invalidated the EPA
Final Rule, courts can no longer be expected to over-
look Fleet Factors because it is inconsistent with the
Final Rule. Even though EPA adopted the invalidated
Final Rule as its enforcement policy with respect to
lender liability and the secured creditor exemption.
lenders still face litigation by other potentially respon-
sible parties.203 Despite the resurrection of Fleet Factors,
it is the decisions in the First, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits which are representative of the coalescing
majority view.204 rather than the Eleventh Circuits
"ctpacity to influence' standard. a strict minority
view.205 A recent case, decided after the Kelley decision
vacated the EPA Final Rule. underscores the point.
On August 2, 1995. the District Court for the
District of Kansas decided Bancanterca Coniniemal Corp.
v. Trnity Indusines.206 In Bancainenca. Bancamerica
Commercial Corporation (BACC) filed a cost-recovery
action against Trinity Industnes (Thnity) seeking to
recover costs BACC incurred responding to a release
of hazardous substances at a BACC site.207 Although
BACC was the current owner, it argued that it was not
a responsible party under CERCLA because it was
exempted from the statutory definition of -owner and
operator.' BACC had become involved with the con-
202. United States v. McLamb. 5 E3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993):
Waterville Indus.. Inc. v. Finance Auth. of Maine. 984 F.2d 549 1st
Cir. 1993).
203. See Steve Cocheo. EPA End-Runs the Courts on
Envwronmental Liabity. AM. BANKRs Ass!N BANKING I.. Mar. 1995. at 9
(explaining that EPA "will issue guidelines to its field offices
directing them not to seek monetary damages from lenders that
follow the overturned lender-liability rule). Because this policy
outlines only EPAs conduct regarding lender practices. lenders
would still face potentially staggering liability because of the
generality of [CERCLAs statutory language and the prospect of
private suits.: Kelley v. EPA. 15 F.3d l100. 1109 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 115 S. CL 900 (1994).
204. These decisions include: Northeast Doran. Inc. v. Key
Bank-of Maine. 15 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1994): Waterville Indus.. Inc. v.
Finance Auth. of Maine. 984- F2d 1993 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Mirabile. 15 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20.992 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4. 1985) and United States v. Nicolet. Inc.. 712 F. Supp.
1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989) [both within theThird Circuiti: United States
v. McLamb. 5 F3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993): In reT.P. Long Chem.. Inc.. 45
B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) Iwithin the Sixth Circuit]: In re
Bergsoe Metal Corp.. 910 E2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990): Bancamenca
Commercial Corp. v. Trinity Indus.. 900 E Supp. 1427 (D. Kan.
1995) [within the Tenth Circuit].
205. These decisions include: Guidice v. BFG Electroplating
& Mfg. Co.. Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989) Iwithin the Third
Circuiti: United States v. Maryland'Bank & Trust Co.. 632 F. Supp.
573 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.. 901 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1990). cert. denid. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
taminated site when it accepted the deed to the prop-
erty from a previous owner in lieu of foreclosure.20 9
Like Mirabile and In re Berg se, Banrcamerica held that
a lender must actually participate in management of
a borrower's business before it will become liable
under CERCLA 21 0 "AI secured lender does not par-
ticipate in the management of a facility by taking
actions related to the financial aspects of the facili-
ty."2II In adopting tlls standard, the Bancameria court
declined to follow FMt Factors' narrower view, explain-
ing that liability should be based "solely on the
lender's capability to influence the decisions about
disposal of hazardous substances. 2 2 In applying this
standard, the Bancaraefica court found that none of
BACC's activities with the debtor rose to the level of
"day-to-day operations" so as to void the application
of the secured creditor exception.213
With respect to whether BACC held "indicia of
ownership" primarily to protect its security interest,
the Bancamefica court looked into why BACC held title
to the contaminated property.2 14 Citing Watervile
Industries and McLamb. the court noted that a lender
does not necessarily lose its protection under the
secured creditor exemption when it becomes a title
holder, so long as the lender takes prompt action to
sell the property.2 I5 Since BACC had made adequate
efforts to dispose of the property after it took title to
it. the court concluded that BAdC met the require-
ment that a lender hold "indicia of ownership" pri-
madly to protect its security interest3' 6
206. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Trinity Indus.. 900 E
Supp. 1427 (D. Kan. 1995). TheTenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
yet to hear a case Interpreting CERCLKs secured aeditor exemp-
tion. Id. at 1456.
207. Id. at 1435.
208. Id.at 1457.
209. Id. at 1438. Under this loan agreement-
BACC tooka security Interest in the accounts receivable.
Inventory, machlnery. equipment, and real estate. The
agreement provided a formula to determine the maxi-
mum amount that [the debtorl could borrow at any one
time. The agreement gave BACC certain rights which
Included receipt of periodic financial statements, the
ability to Inspect the inventory on the premises, and the
option to notify the Idebtor'sl customers to send remit-
tances directly to BACC.
Id. at 1441.
210. Id. at 1457.
211. L.
212. Id.: cf United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.. 901 F2d
1550 (1 th Cir. 1990), art. denLed. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
213. 900 F. Supp. at 1457.
214. Id.
215. Id.at 1457-58.
216. Id. at 1458. See 42 US.C. § 9601(20](A) (1994).
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While Fleet Factors still represents "wide-open"
liability for secured creditors who participate in the
management of their debtor's business, the afore-
mentioned cases illustrate that other circuits may
be less extreme. These cases also offer some indi-
cation that the Fleet Factors decision is merely a
minority view.217
V. The Future Of Lender Liability
Since Kelley v. EPA, lenders, through various
Superfund reauthorization efforts, have lobbied
Congress for clarification of the secured creditor
exemption 218 Granting legislative relief to the lend-
ing community should not be difficult; arguably,
there is broad support for clarifying the scope of lia-
bility.219 Clearly, the American Bankers Association
favors certainty in the area. This is also true of bor-
rowers, especially industry borrowers who will- be
,the victims of rising transaction costs as a result of
overly cautious lenders. Finally, lawmakers from
both Republican and Democratic sides of the con-
gressional aisles have evinced support for many of
the proposed bills introduced to codify the EPA
Final Lender Liability Rule.
In 1994, despite such broad support, proposed
bills seeking to codify the EPA Final Rule failed to
pass. The session ended before Congress could get
to them. 220 In 1995, lender liability reform fell victim
to congressional wrangling over other matters,
notably the Republican Congress' self-imposed
prerogatives to pass the "Contract with America"
and balance the budget. Not only did 1995 end
without legislative reform, more significantly, 1995
was the last year for which Congress had authorized
appropriations for Superfund. 221 Now issues such as
joint and several liability are going tc be debated as
the necessity of reauthorization creates an opportu-
nity for Congress to review CERCLA. Although leg-
islative relief for lenders is relatively uncontrover-
sial, reform is likely to be stalled as other more con-
troversial aspects of CERCLA-such as joint and
several liability-are hotly contested and debated.
By itself, a proposed lender liability bill might have
passed virtually in toto. Unfortunately, because of
the compromising that results from comprehensive
legislation, there is always the fear that a proposed
bill addressing lender liability may be altered as
part of a deal to get something else passed in
another part of the Act.
In the meantime, much of the proposed legisla-
tion introduced in 1995 is still alive ,and should be
taken up in the second session of the 104th
Congress. One example is Senate Bill 394,222 Senate
Bill 394, the "Asset Conservation, Lender Liability,
and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1995,"223
seeks to limit the liability of insured depository insti-
tutions and other lenders. The bill would amend
CERCLA to limit lender liability in connection with
property (1) acquired through foreclosLre; (2) subject
to a security interest; (3) held by a lessor pursuant to
an extension of credit; or (4) subject to financial con-
trol pursuant to an extension of credit.2 24 A lender's
liability will be limited to the benefit conferred on the
lender by cleanup efforts.225 However, if a lender
causes or contributes to hazardous substance releas-
217. It is important to note that in Fleet Factors the lender was
not held liable. The Fleet Factors court went beyond the facts of the
case when it presented its "capacity to influence" standard.
Consequently, some courts have even referred to the Fleet Factors
standard as merely dicta suggesting that 'capacity to influence'
management of lal debtor's business and waste disposal may be
enough to impose CERCLA owner/operator liability on a lender."
Ashland Oil. Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp., 810 E Supp. 1057,
1060 (D. Minn. 1993) (emphasis added).
218. In fact, efforts at legislative clarification of the secured
creditor exemption predate Kelley. and predate the EPA Final
Rule. Even when the EPA Final Rule was in force, lenders were
advised to seek legislative darification because the Final Rule
could not be relied upon to bind federal courts or third parties.
See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100. 1109 (D.C. Cir.) (advising lenders
and EPA to seek congressional relief because of the prospect of
private suits), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1994).
Superfund became ineligible for additional appropriations
on December 31, 1995. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301(l). 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
Consequently, CERCLA is ripe for reform dunng the Superfund
reauthonzation wrangling surely to come this session in 1996.
219. In 1994, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and EPA supported the Superfund
reform bill that was ultimately abandoned on October 5 of that
year in part because of time constraints. See Time Restraints.
Wrangling Kill Reform Bill; New Effort to Change CERCLA Promised Next
Year. ENV'T REP. (BNA), Oct. 14, 1994, at 1172. Carol M. Browner,
EPA Administrator, remained optimistic, saying that the
broad-based coalition that supported the reform effort, "ranging
from corporations to small business to environmentalists, devel-
oped a vital bluepnnt for change." Id.
On February 14, 1996, Rep. John Dingell (C-MI) expressed In
a letter to Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-VA), House Commerce
Committee Chair and main supporter of House Bill 2500. his will-
ingness to find bipartisan consensus on CERCLA reform, noting
that bipartisan support already exists with re-pect to reducing
liability for small businesses and lenders. Hoase Leaders Support
Bipartisan Effort on Brownfields, Other CERCLA Reform Issues, ENV'T REP.,
(BNA), Feb. 23, 1996, at 2036.
220. Time Restraints, Wrangling Kill Reform Bill; New Effort to
Change CERCLA Promised Next Year. supra note 219. at 1172.
221. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub, L,
No. 101-508, § 6301(1), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
222. S. 394, 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995).
223. Senate Bill 394 was introduced by Senator Alfonse
D'Amato (R-NY). The Bill has been referred to the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee.
224. S. 394. § 3. 104th Cong. Ist Sess. (1995).
225. Id.
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es, it will be liable for response costs.226 Senate Bill
394 also attempts to codify certain provisions of the
EPA Final Rule by amending CERCLAs secured cred-
itor exemption to include a definition of "participa-
tion in management.2 7 Similarly, House Bill 200, the
"Lender and Fiduciary Fairness in Liability Act of
1995." would also amend CERCLAs secured creditor
exemption to include a definition of "participation in
management"22 8
House Bill 1362. the "Financial Institutions
Regulatory Relief Act of 1995," seeks to amend the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act so that "no lender
shall be7 liable pursuant to a Federal environmental
law."229 House Bill 1362 would also codify certain
provisions of the EPA Final Rule by amending
CERCLAs secured creditor exemption to include a
definition of "participation in management."230
Moreover, the bill rejects the Eleventh Circuit's
"capacity to influence" dicta in Fleet Factors.3i A third
bill, House Bill 2178 seeks to promote redevelop-
ment of brownfields by providing federal assistance
for brownfield cleanups and other purposes.32 It
would also codify the EPA Final Rule by deeming it
validly issued pursuant to' the authority of CERCLA.
House Bill 2178 would also deny federal courts
lurisdiction to review the rule.2
33
There are two bills specifically focused on
amending CERCLA. The first, House Bill 2500. the
"Reform of Superfund Act of 1995." is the
Republican-introduced reauthorization bill.P4 The
second. House Bill 228. the "Superfund Reform Act of
1995." was introduced by Democrats and would also
codify the EPA Final Rule.23 Like House Bill 2178.
House Bill 228 would remove review of the EPA Final
Rule from the jurisdiction of the courts 23 6 by explicit-
ly delegating authority to the President and to EPA to
promulgate such regulations as they deem necessary
to carry out the provisions of CERCLA.2
When the D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA Final
Rule in Kelley v. EPA. it explained that CERCLA
does not authorize EPA to issue binding rules
defining or interpreting the Act's liability
scheme.23 House Bill 228 responds to the D.C.
Circuit's decision by proposing to provide EPA
through presidential designation, the authority the
D.C. Circuit said EPA lacked. 9 However, the bill
does more than just codify the EPA Final Rule.
House Bill 228 seems to give EPA a "blank check"
to promulgate regulations deemed necessary to
carry out the provisions of the Act.240 This broad
delegation of power is troublesome for two rea-
sons. First, it would seemingly allow EPA to fiddle
with CERCLAs liability scheme so that cost-recov-
ery actions could be substantively altered. Second.
such an unbridled grant of power contradicts tra-
ditional notions of separation of powers.
226.Jd.
227. Id.
228. H.R. 200. § 2. 104th Cong.. ist Sess. (1995). H.R. 200
was introduced by Representative Fred Upton (R-MI). This bill
has bipartisan support from four Democrat and fourteen
Republican cosponsors. The bill has been referred to the House
Commerce Committee.
229. H.R. 1362. § 301. 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995). H.R.
1362 was introduced by Representative Douglous K. Bereuter
(R-NE). The bill has bipartisan support from ten Democrat and
fifty-three Republican cosponsors. H.R. 1362 is currently in
markup in the House Banking and.Finanaal Services Committee.
230. Section 301 of H.R. 1362 states that "the term 'partic-
pate in management" means actually participating in the manage-
ment or operational affairs of other persons' activities, and does
not include merely having the capacity to influence ... such activ-
ities." H.R. 1362. § 301(a). 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995) (empha-
sis added).
231. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.. 901 -.2d 1550 (Ilth
Cir. 1990). cert. denied. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
232. H.R. 2178. 104th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1995). The bill was
introduced by Representative Sherrod Brown (D-OH). H.R. 2178
has been referred to the House Commerce Committee.
233. Id.
234. H.R. 2500. 104th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1995). The bill was
introduced by Representative Michael Oxley (R-OH). H.R. 2500 Is
the main Superfund reauthorization effort, and has bipartisan
support from twenty-two Republican and two Democratic
cosponsors. The bill has been approved for full committee action.
235. H.R. 228. § 407(b). 104th Cong.. lstSess. (1995). The
bill was Introduced by Representative John Dingell (D-4,1i). for
himself and for Representative Norman Mineta (D-CA). H.R. 228
has been referred to the Committee on Commerce and to the
Committees on Transportation and infrastructure and ways and
Means. H.R. 228 Is Identical to last term's H.R. 3800. 103d Cong..
2d Sess. (1994).
236. H.R. 228. § 407(bl(2). 104th Cong.. Ist Sess. (I995).
237. Id. § 407(a). Section 407 provides:
The President... is authorized to promulgate such
regulations as the President... deems necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act. and to delegate and assign
any duties or powers imposed upon or assigned to him
by this Act. including the authority to promulgate regu-
lations. The preceding sentence includes authority to
clarify or Interpret all terms and to implement any provt-
slon of this Act
Id.
238. 15 F3d 1100. 1107-08 (D.C. Cir.). cer. denzd. 115 S. Ct.
900 (1994).
239. Id. See H.R. 228. § 407(a). 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995).
240. Some commentators feel that this type of reauthonza-
tion effort misses the point made by the D.C. Circuit in K y. See
Richard A. Horsch. Lender LLn5XtyJrlduan issues Addressed in the
Supofund RtautAnzallnn. 5 Fcniw&t Evn. Ll. 309 (1994). Horsch
states that the D.C. Circuit in Ke', explained that the problem
with the EPA Rule was that EPA does not really define specific
terms, but instead uses CERCLAs statutory terms as a starting
point to devise 'a comprehensive regulatory regimen to address
the liability problems facing secured creditors." Id. (quoting KeL-y
v. EPA. 15 F3d at 1108).
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Congress certainly has the authority to enact a
statute codifying the EPA Final Rule. 241 However, it
is highly questionable as a matter of policy for
Congress to give EPA broad power to "promulgate
such regulations as the President deems nec-
essary to carry out the provisions" of CERCLA. 242
This would seemingly allow EPA to modify
CERCLAs entire liability scheme, including sec-
tion 107, through regulation or through interpre-
tive rulemaking. Under section 107 cost-recovery
actions, EPA is one of many possible litigants-
usually a plaintiff seeking to show a defendant's
liability for response costs.2 43 However, as a result
of House Bill 228, EPA would be able to resolve
every ambiguity in CERCLAs liability scheme in its
favor. To allow EPA to include or exclude by defin-
ition a party from liability is clearly inconsistent
with EPA's role as a litigator in section 107
cost-recovery actions. 244
Permitting EPA to promulgate any regulation it
deems necessary to implement CERCLA would also
frustrate the judiciary's traditional role as the ulti-
mate interpreter of CERCLAs liability scheme.245
241. Congress has the power to enact legislation replacing
the EPA Final Rule pursuant to its inherent legislative power,
especially under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CoNsr. art. i. 8, d. 3.
Even the D.C. Circuit in Kelley suggested that congressional relief
was an alternative to the EPA Rule: 'We well recognize the diffi-
culties that lenders face in the absence of the clarity EPs regula-
tion would have provided. Before turning to this rulemaking, EPA
sought congressional relief and was rebuffed. We see no alterna-
tive but that EPA try again. 15 F.3d at 1109.
242. H.R. 228. § 407. 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995).
243. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (1994); 15 E3d 1100. See. e.g.,
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573. 577
(explaining how EPA is trying to 'pin liability" on MB&T under
CERCLA § 107(a)(i)).
244. '[Tlo provide EPA with interpretive authority lover
CERCL's liability scheme] would be akin to providing crinal
prosecutors (as opposed to the courts) with the ultimate author-
ity to interpret the enforcement provisions they implement.-
Craig N. Johnston, Who Decides Who's Liable Under CERCLA?: EPA
Slips a Bombshell Into the CERCLA Reauthonzation Process, 24 EvrlvT L.
1045, 1048 (1994).
245. Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v. Bush. 946 F.2d 918. 926 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Williams. J.. dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. denied.
112S. Ct. 1584 (1992):
ITIhe courts appear generally to have accorded EPA no def-
erence even in its interpretations of the liability provisions
of CERCLA section 107. interpretations that EPA must
make in deciding whether to sue to compel compliance or
recover cleanup costs from responsible parties .... As the
EPA simply acts as prosecutor in such cases, the courts
accord its judgment no more deference than they would a
Unites States Attorney's decision to seek an indictment.
246. 15 F.3d at 1108. it thus follows that EPs views regard-
ing who is liable are entitled to no deference. Id. See also 126 CONG.
REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Randolph), repnnted in I Superfund: A Legislative History 168
(Helen C. Needles & Mark Menefee eds., Envtl. L. Inst. 1983): 126
CONG. REc. H 11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep.
CERCLAs legislative history dem;nstrates that
Congress intended that the courts, riot EPA, would
interpret the various ambiguities in CERCLAs lia-
bility scheme 2 46 It Is unwise for EPA to dislocate the
courts from their intended role as sole interpreters
of CERCLA liability. Otherwise, EPA would be free
to use its rulemaking powers to bind both the
courts and its party-opponents m litigation. 247
Every time EPA is dissatisfied by a court's decision
interpreting section 107, it could "c'eate a record,
promulgate a rule," and then use that rule to its
advantage.248
Over the past fifty years, Congress has contin-
ually delegated both rulemaking and administra-
tive functions to executive agencies.2 49 Congress
cannot directly delegate its legislative power to
any other branch of government. 2  However, it
can delegate the authority to effectuate legislative
policies or statutes to federal agencies, so long as
Congress defines the scope of the agency's
authority.25i Essentially, this nondelegation doc-
trine requires Congress to lay down a "primary
standard"2 2 or an "intelligible p~inciple" 2 3 in
Florio). repnnted in I Superfund: A Legislative History 165,
247. For example, "Join the issue of joint and several liability, ...
EPA could fill in the legislative silence with a corstruct of its choos-
ing. dictating the circumstances under which thL; particularly harsh
form of liability could be imposed." Johnston. supr2 note 244, at 1051.
248. Id. at 1052 (quotations omitted).
249. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTUTIONAL
LAw, § 4.8, at 156 (4th ed,. 1991) (describing how the modern
political process -has resulted in federal control of a wide variety
of intrastate and multistate commercial matters landl
increased congressional use of federal executive agencies to
administer federal statutes and to promulgate regulations which
effectuate legislative policies'}.
250. This principle is grounded in the separation of powers
concept reflected in the structure of the Constitution creating the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. U.S,
CONsT. arts. I, 11, Ill. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNIA, supra note 249,
§ 3.5. at 126 (providing a historical overview of the separation of
powers and its. basis in the writings of John Locke and
,Montesquieu). Because the Constitution delineates the respec-
tive responsibilities of the three branches of government,
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it Is vested, ALA,
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S, 495, 529 (1935),
With respect to the role of agencies, this "nondelegatlon" doc-
tnne is violated if Congress "fails to give legislative definition of
the scope of the agency's power.' NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note
249, at 156. See generally Peter Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L REv. I, 9 (1982) (providing a historical
overview of the "nondelegation" doctrine).
251. Lichter v. United States. 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (express-
ing that Congress needs to provide adequate statutory definition
of agency power in order to avoid excessive delegation of legisla-
tive power).
252. Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
253. j.W. Hampton Co. v. United States, 276 U,S. 394. 409
(1928).
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order to guide the agency's exercise of its delegat-
ed authority.254
While House Bill 228 attempts to resurrect the
EPA Final Rule, its blanket grant of power to the
President--authority to "promulgate such regulations
as the President (or the [EPAJ) deems necessary to
carry out, the provisions of the Act"25--may be an
excessive delegation of legislative power because
Congress is neglecting to set any standards for when
EPA should exercise its broad power. Section 407 of
House Bill 228 creates in EPA the power to make law
since it can change liability interpretations. As a result.
section 407 encourages judicially uncontrollable dele-
gation of legislative power since its decisions regard-
ing CERCLA liability can always be overturned by
EPAs rulemaking authority under section 407.
Congress should not give such overreaching power to
EPA The grant of such broad power strains traditional
concepts of separation of powers, and is simply incon-
sistent with EPs role under CERCLA as a litigant in
cost-recovery actions. Section 407(a) should be struck
from House Bill 228 and lenders should be careful not
to support similar legislative fixes.
VI. Conclusion
When Kelley v. EPA vacated the EPA Final Lender
Liability Rule, the D.C. Circuit opened the door for
courts to render decisions following Flat Factors.
Despite this opportunity, lenders should not feel a
great loss without the EPA Final Rule. The fact that
254. The Supreme Court found Congress to have violated
the nondelegation doctrine in both Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.
293 U.S. 388 (1935) and in A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In 1933 Congress enacted the
National Industnal Recovery Act (NIRA) which authorized the
president to establish and enforce -codes of fair competition" for
trade and industnes. NIRA also authonzed the president to pro-
hibit the transportation of petroleum products ("hot oil') pro-
duced in violation of state statutes. In Panama. the Supreme
Court struck down the hot oil part of NIRA holding that the Act
was an excessive delegation of legislative power to the president
because Congress failed to set any standards for when the presi-
dent should exercise his discretionary power to prohibit ship-
ment of hot oil. Similarly. in Sdchter. the Court held that allow-
ing the president to approve and adopt codes of fair conduct"
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The nondelegation doctrine has remained relative dormant
since Panama and Schedter. NowAK & RomuNoA. supra note 249. at
156 n-4. Nevertheless. popular dissatisfaction with political grid-
lock and what some perceive to be excessive administrative reg-
ulation has re-focused attention on the nondelegation doctrine.
See. e.g.. Ernest Gelhom. Returning to First Pnnciples. 36 Am. U. L
.REv. 345 (1987) (arguing for a "reinvigorated" nondelegation doc-
tnne if the alternative is executive agencies using delegated leg-
islative power to create "private goods-): David Schoenbrod,
Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Consitutional Purposes of
the Defegation Doctrine. 36 ANL U. L REv. 355. 389 (1987) (arguing
that "[iln addition -to accountability, the nghts of regulatees
should provoke governmental enforcement of the delegation
doctrine"). Cf. Richard B. Stewart. Beyond Delegation Doctrine. 36A%..
the courts in In re Bergsoe. Waterville Industries, Northeast
Doran, and McLamb refused to follow the lead of Fleet
Factors--while not relying on the EPA Final Rule even
before it was officially vacated--demonstrates that
Fleet Factors may simply be an anomaly. Moreover, the
decision of the district court in Bancamerica further
indicates that Fleet Factors is a minority view. Still, the
potentiar for liability will always exist.
1996 should prove to be a significant year for
environmental law and lender liability when
Congress undertakes Reauthorization efforts.
Congress should respond by providing meaningful
reform and should address the purpose of the lia-
bility scheme created by section 107. In so doing,
Congress should realize that simple legislative fixes
which merely pronounce that EPA has full authority
to define or interpret CERCLAs liability scheme are
inconsistent with the overall scheme of CERCLA.
especially with regard to cost recovery actions in
which EPA is just another litigant. Moreover, such a
blanket grant of power to EPA. without specific
standards to define liability, is potentially an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The EPA possesses no special expertise war-
ranting Congressional deference. Therefore,
Congress should not delegate interpretive authority
to EPA. Interpretation of CERCLAs liability scheme
is and should remain the responsibility of the judi-
ciary. 2 There is simply no justification or benefit
for the plenary grant of power in section 407 of
House Bill 228, and that grant should be deleted
U. L Rv. 323 (1987) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine
should not be used because It is too unwieldy).
Present members on the Supreme Court may be inclined to
Invoke the nondelegation doctrine. For example. Justice Rehnquist
would have Invoked the doctrine to strike dawn § 6(b](5) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 because standing
alone, It -would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delega-
tions of legislative power." industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst.. 448 US. 607.675 (1980) (Rehrquist. I.
concumng). After Indrstru Unn was decided, then Professor
Scalia commented on the case. Professor Scalia had reservations
about resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine but noted that
"lelven with all Its Frankensteinlike warts. knobs, and (concededly)
dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing
from the Ice." Antonin Scalia. A Net on th- Benzm Cae. 4 RE.a-
luly-Aug. 1980, at 25. 28. lustice Scalia apparently believed the
doctrine was 'worth hewing from the ice" in Mistretta v. United
States where he Introduced his own test for determining an
improper delegation of power. Mistretta v. United States. 488 US.
361. 413 (1989) (Scalia. I.. dissenting). Justice Scalia would have
struck down the federal sentencing guidelines because in his opin-
Ion. Congress cannot create an agency to promulgate sentencing
guidelines that have the force of lT. Id. According to lustice Scalia.
by delegating such power to agencies. Congress is creating "a new
Branch altogether, a sort of iunior-varsity Congress." Id. at 427.
255. H.R. 228. § 407(a): 104th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1995).
256. Wagner Seed Co.. Inc. v. Bush. 946 F.2d 918. 926 (D.C.
r. 1991) (William. I.. dissenting). (citation omitted). crt, dene.
112S. Ct. 1584 (1992).
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X from the rest of the bill. The Reauthorization debate
in 1996 presents the opportunity for lenders, indus-
try, chemical manufacturers, EPA, state govern-
ments, and environmentalists to participate in the
debate over CERCLA reform. Congress should take
advantage of this opportunity for debate to make
fundamental decisions regarding CERCLA's liability
scheme, and should not merely pass to executive
agencies the work that Congress very well can and
should do itself.
